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Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology:
An Analysis of the United States Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program 
Lisa Madelon Campbell†
Biometrics, when used to link an individual to a. . . the social consequences of new technological systems
will always be largely unforeseen and unintended . . . particular event in time or place, may lend credence to
Human destiny emerges as the unintended consequence of other information that may be available about an indi-
invention. We are performing a grand experiment on our- vidual’s identity or activities. 5 The most elemental bio-selves in the complete absence of informed prior consent. 1
metric measurements include hair and eye colour,
gender, and skin colour. Photographs will usually recordThis article explores increased governmental
these forms of biometrics. Facial recognition technologyinterest in the use of biometric measurements as a
involves taking measurements of the contours of ameans of identifying individuals and tracing their move-
person’s face from different viewpoints, and comparingments. Private industries, of course, are equally interested
these with images in an electronic database or an imagein biometrics, and often similarly capable of collecting
on an identity card. With facial thermography, the heatand storing biometric information. For example,
patterns emanating from each person’s face are measuredmerchants in the United Kingdom require customers
from thousands of angles, creating a ‘‘heat’’ image. 6 Handwho pay by cheque to provide a thumbprint as an addi-
geometry measures the hand and the spaces betweentional security measure against potential fraud. 2 The
fingers to generate a dimensional record. 7 More sophisti-issues raised by the use of biometrics in the private sector
cated biometric information includes measurements ofare somewhat different than those that arise in the
hand geometry, fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acidpublic context. This article explores the increased reli-
(DNA) patterns, and eye iris scans. 8ance upon individual biometric measurements by gov-
ernments in general and the United States of America in
particular, and analyzes the ensuing implications for the
privacy rights of individuals travelling to and living in The Evolution of Biometrics 
that country.
ingerprint technology was developed in the lateF nineteenth century and is now widely used to verify
identification. Today, facial recognition systems used inBiometric Measurements Defined 
public areas such as walkways, airports, and sports arenas
iometrics has been described as ‘‘the automatic will alert the monitors of the system when there is aB identification or verification of living human beings match between an individual’s face captured by the
based on behavioural or physiological characteristics’’. 3 It camera and a database of photographs. 9
involves taking or recording some of an individual’s most DNA analysis is currently the most precise bio-inalienable biological parts and using these to identify metric measurement possible; because of the finely-him or her. The information can be used in two ways: tuned nature of the testing, however, it is also the most
(1) to verify that the person is who they say they are, prone to error. 10 Short tandem repeat (STR) DNA anal-
by comparing a previously stored biometric ysis is the method most commonly used in the forensic
measurement to a fresh measurement provided science context. STR involves counting the number of
by the individual, or repeating sequences in a given DNA sample, and per-
(2) to identify a person, by comparing their bio- forming a statistical analysis of the probability that these
metric measurement against a larger database of repeating sequences will appear elsewhere. 11 While this
stored measurements. 4 method of DNA analysis is far more reliable than earlier
†© L.M. Campbell, Counsel, Department of Justice Canada. The views and opinions expressed in this paper, prepared for the 19th Conference of the
International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law June 26–30, 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland, are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the































































100 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
methods, 12 errors may arise from animal contamination aural resonance time-span. In addition to variations
or mixing with other human DNA.13 The most reliable among subjects, environmental factors must also be
samples come directly from blood and other bodily taken into account. Facial recognition systems may fail if
fluids; however, DNA may be culled from discarded lighting, position, or backgrounds are changed. An indi-
facial tissues or from postal stamps that have been licked vidual’s fingerprints are never completely identical, and
by an individual. Essentially, human beings leave a trail will vary significantly with changes in moisture and tem-
of genetic information wherever they go. perature. 19 Fingerprints from the same digit may vary
considerably due to differences in the pressure applied,DNA databases help to assess the result of a match
or whether there was something on the finger such asbetween an individual’s DNA and DNA found some-
moisture or another substance. 20 In an interesting inter-where else. 14 Recent technologies convert biometric
sect between science and technology, biometric mea-measurements into algorithms, which are then used for
surement systems may fail when faced with a scientifi-matching. As is discussed above, the science of biomet-
cally engineered body part such as a glass eye orrics is based upon the statistical likelihood that two mea-
prosthetic hand. Identical twins have the same DNAsurements are a match. Computer matching techniques
profiles, and persons in the same family may have DNAhave an error rate that necessarily produces false positive
that appears very similar.results, as well as false negative results. 15 This statistical
The problems posed by these potential errors areerror rate is significant, because as we will see below, it is
further compounded when biometric information isone of several potential flaws in collections of biometric
compiled into databases, as is generally required in orderinformation.
for it to be useful to governments and other entities. The
integrity of databases is essential to producing accurate
results, and this integrity may be adversely affected by
Practical and Theoretical Problems various factors, including samples from a single indi-
vidual appearing more than once. For example, it isin Biometric Applications 
important that the sampling methods be the same, and
iometric measurements tend to be treated as infal- that scientists analyzing the data receive the sameB lible; however, they are subject to error and they training and apply the same methods of analysis.
tend to be most reliable when paired with other identi- One major assumption underlying DNA databases
fying information. Every reliable method of identifica- is that the DNA of the population from whom the sam-
tion should have these features: ples were taken is sufficiently homogeneous that differ-
ences in a given strand of DNA may be interpreted as(1) it should measure a fixed and unalterable indi-
statistically significant. 21 The scientific exploration ofvidual characteristic;
human beings is far from complete. The human genome(2) that characteristic should be present in every
was sequenced in its entirety in 2003, 22 and scientistsindividual;
have a relatively good understanding of the chemical
(3) that characteristic should be unique to every composition of DNA. Little is known, however, about
individual; and the human genome’s highly complex structure and func-
tions. 23(4) that characteristic should be recordable, such
that it can be compared against others. 16 There are slight variations in alleles24 among ethnic
groups, although with the increased movement of popu-Many systems of biometric measurement do not yet
lations around the globe, it is anticipated that these willhave common standards, so the tendency is to scan more
decrease over time. 25 Blood relatives may have DNA thatdata rather than less, in order to later accommodate
is similar in appearance; thus, when one member of aspecific data measurements. 17 As well, biometric mea-
family is required to give a sample to a DNA databank,surements may not be designed to accommodate the
the potential is there for identifying information aboutdifferent forms in which individuals will present them-
several people to be included in the databank. 26 In fact,selves. Differently-abled persons may confound bio-
at the genetic level, all homo sapiens are relatively homo-metric measurements; for example, someone with a
geneous as a species, with more variation apparentmedical condition called pendular nystagmus, which
within small populations than between major racialresults in a constantly moving iris, cannot be iris-
groups. 27 As researchers have observed, using geneticscanned.18 Unless they are able to take into account
information to categorize racial groups is fraught withevery possible variant, biometric measurements will nec-
problems; they advocate for more work on the biologicalessarily be flawed.
and socio-cultural factors that link genetics to race and
‘‘Outliers’’, or departures from the mean, must be ethnicity. 28
factored into every biometric system. For example, a
speaker recognition system based upon aural resonance
and designed using male subjects will not function in






























































Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology 101
the future for purposes never contemplated by individ-The Privacy Implications of the Use
uals when they first gave the information. That thisof Biometric Measurements 
could happen is quite possible for two reasons:
f privacy is a continuum, and inviolability of the phys- (1) Function creep: the availability of databases con-I ical space in which one lives and travels is at one end, taining biometric information makes them sus-
then the other end, and perhaps the most sacrosanct, is ceptible to other uses and of interest to other
the inviolability of the self. This includes not only the entities. Insurance companies, for example, are
physical self, but the self as self-defined. When states use keenly interested in genetic data that may pro-
biometric measurements to identify individuals, they are, vide information about whether individuals are
in a sense, pinning people to their biology. Biology is an likely to develop certain illnesses. Marketing
almost inescapable aspect of the self. agencies are interested in people’s movements
and activities for purposes of designing adver-Most incursions into personal privacy are the result
tising. Banks and other financial institutions areof an exchange of some sort; an individual purchases fuel
interested in biometric information as a way ofin order to heat his or her residence, and this in turn
adding further security to their transactions. Ancreates usage patterns that provide information about
important aspect of this is that certain biologicalhim or her. Biological information results from simply
information may be mined extensively andexisting, and individuals cannot help creating it.
indefinitely: once a DNA sample is collected, itSome view increases in surveillance by biological
may be retained and tested several times forand other means as dehumanizing, an invasion of per-
different purposes unless checks are put in place.sonhood, and suggest that ‘‘total visibility infantilizes
people. It impoverishes their inner life and makes them (2) Technological advances: given the rapid pace of
more vulnerable to oppression from without’’. 29 From technological change, it may be impossible to
this perspective, people will recoil from certain activities predict the types of information that may be
for fear that they will be traced, and if they do engage, drawn from a given sample of DNA. While the
they do so in a circumscribed fashion, knowing that they science of DNA has evolved in the past 20 years,
may be continuously monitored. it is far from complete. The Human Genome
Project successfully sequenced the entire gene;If, however, privacy is viewed as control over expres-
however, current DNA analysis uses only a frac-sive information, an entirely new debate begins. 30 Each
tion of the gene sequence. There are two impor-use of peoples’ personal information can be gauged
tant and emerging fields of scientific researchagainst whether it encroaches upon that aspect of their
involving DNA:self, depending upon whether they have expressed them-
selves as a parent, a consumer, a voter, or a sexual (i) Genetic diseases — flaws in the genetic code
being. 31 This view is likely the preferable one, given that are now known to contribute to up to
in modern society, most people with access to it will use 4,000 hereditary diseases, such as cystic
technology to express themselves in a multitude of ways, fibrosis. Genetic mutations are also associ-
many of which can be recorded or traced. ated with predisposition to other illnesses,
such as cancer and diabetes.The difference with biometrics, though, is that one
cannot help but exist, and by so doing, continuously (ii) Behaviour — genes appear to have some
emanate expressive data. Perhaps even here, though, influence on behaviour. Genes have been
technological change will outpace the capacity to trace found to influence sexual behaviour, thrill-
individuals by virtue of their biology. The co-discoverer seeking, and violent tendencies. 34 While
of the structure of DNA advocates for germline genetic not determinative, genes play a role, along
intervention in humans in order to possibly improve the with the environment and other factors, in
genome.32 In the context of an application in the United how individuals conduct themselves.
Kingdom to patent a process to genetically engineer An example of ‘‘function creep’’ exists in the United
mammals so that pharmaceutical products may be pro- States, where 20 states now allow law enforcement agen-
duced in their milk, the applicant seeks the rights to cies to use collected DNA samples in research aimed at
genetically engineered human females. 33 improving forensic techniques. This research is partly
If individuals want to avoid giving off biological directed towards the controversial field of examining
information, they must actively intervene in order to genes for predictors of criminal behaviour. 35 While there
protect it, by covering faces so as not to be identified, is some suggestion that DNA may play a role in pre-
covering fingers or wiping surfaces so as not to leave dicting human behaviour, most scientists agree that an
fingerprints, and retrieving tissues with possible DNA in approach that focuses solely on genetic indicia of beha-
them. It is one thing for biometric measurements to be viour is destined to fail, as it does not consider the essen-
taken for purposes to which an individual consents. The tial interaction between genes and the environment:
collection of biometric measurements by governments Behavior flows from brains that (a) encounter specific envi-






























































102 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
is as importantly shaped by environments as it is by genes. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States
The essential point is that biological processes, properly in September 2001, international and national govern-
understood, provide no support for genetically deterministic ment organizations enacted legislation and adoptedviews of human behavior, whether they arise from political
other measures aimed at combating terrorist acts, andmotivations or from misconceptions. 36
governments the world over have shown an unprece-It is unclear whether biometric measurements are
dented interest in collecting biological informationconsidered ‘‘data’’ for purposes of privacy legislation.
about individuals.Danish authorities have decided that there is personal
information within human biological material; however, Of the 15 European Union member states, 11 have
a Norwegian tribunal held37 that blood samples in a national identification cards; in France, it is voluntary,
hospital were not personal information within the while in other countries, such as Greece and Spain, it is
meaning of that country’s Personal Data Act of 2000. 38 compulsory for citizens to carry an identity card. 45 Thai-
Most privacy legislation was developed prior to the wide- land’s Central Population Database is populated with
spread use of biometrics as a method of identifying citi- information linked to a national identity card system.
zens, and before technological advancements in areas The cards contain facial images, electronic fingerprints,
such as DNA analysis. While many of the natural justice and other personal information, and are linked to an
principles underlying most privacy legislation would electronic database to which most government agencies
apply to the collection and storage of biological data, have access. 46 There are many countries in which
some principles, such as those governing the use of that national identity schemes do not exist formally, but
data, would not. Biometric measurements are subject to rather in a de facto sense. Initially developed as a permit
uses that may be very different than those that would to allow individuals to drive vehicles, the drivers’ licence
apply to other types of information, including replicating in many countries has now become a form of identifica-
the biometric, testing it for genetic information, or tion used to facilitate a number of transactions unrelated
testing it against information found at a crime scene. to driving. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
The European Convention for the Protection of Victoria describes drivers’ licences as a rich source of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Per- personal information that is akin to a national identity
sonal Data (the Convention)39 has, since 1981, been card. 47
open for signature by any country as long as that country
The United Nations Security Council passed Reso-ensures that its national legislation conforms with the
lution 137348 which, while failing to define terrorism,principles of the Convention. Of the natural justice prin-
requires member states to adopt a broad spectrum ofciples underlying the Convention, one of the most signif-
measures to combat terrorism. These measures includeicant is that data collected must be accurate, sufficient
the sharing of information and restrictions on the move-for the purpose for which it was collected, and retained
ments of terrorists. The UN Counter-Terrorism Com-only for as long as required. 40 The Convention allows for
mittee monitors state compliance with the Resolution. 49the uninterrupted flow of personal information between
The European Union in 2002 adopted a Frameworkcountries party to the Convention.
Decision on Combating Terrorism50 that contains a
While not specifically addressing human biological broad definition of terrorist acts and requires member
samples, the 1995 European Commission’s Directive on states to legislate in compliance with the decision.
data protection in defining ‘‘identifiability’’ provides that
it includes identification by reference to factors specific The International Civil Aviation Organization has
to physical and physiological identity. 41 The Commis- recommended facial recognition as a standard biometric
sion’s comments leading up to the finalization of the measurement that ought to be included in identity doc-
directive show that it intended that the term ‘‘personal uments, and suggests that each country should be free to
data’’ be broadly interpreted to encompass fingerprints add a second biometric of its choice. 51
and genetic characteristics. 42 The Project Group on Data
Measures aimed at preventing terrorism in Ger-Protection, a consultative body composed of information
many empower the country’s Office for the Protection ofexperts from the member countries, prepares reports on
the Constitution and Federal Intelligence Service to trackbiometrics. 43
non-citizens by means of a centralized database in which
individuals’ biometric measurements and other personal
information is stored. 52 Similarly, applying Britain’s 2001
Governmental Interest in Biometrics anti-terrorism legislation, law enforcement authorities
may now search suspects without a warrant and collectTo Track Individuals 
biometric measurements such as fingerprints. 53
tates have long used individual identifiers to enableS them to track the movements and whereabouts of Immigration officials in the United States, Canada,
citizens. In the Roman Empire, soldiers, slaves, and citi- and at the Israeli–Palestinian border currently use hand
zens were identified by means of tiles; the South African geometry technology to identify travellers. 54 In a pilot






























































Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology 103
lands, and Germany, travellers will be given a card that Security and Visa Entry Reform Act63 (EBSVERA). Provi-
contains their unique hand measurements. sions in the first and latter Acts required that biometric
identifiers be used in travel documents and that an auto-Proposed U.S. legislation would require microchips
mated entry and exit data system be developed thatwith biometric information to be implanted in state
would work in concert with other law enforcement anddriver’s licences, in order to render licences more secure
national security databases. 64and less susceptible to forgery. Opponents characterize
the move as a shift towards a de facto national identity Interestingly, U.S. officials call this capacity for inter-
card. 55 Social assistance recipients in some states in the operability, which links an entry-exit database to other
United States must provide their fingerprints, and finger- government databases and allows access by a vast array
prints are included in driver’s licences in California. 56 of U.S. law enforcement agencies, ‘‘Chimera’’. 65 That
Citizens of the United Kingdom are arguably the word, as used in Greek mythology, means a fire-
most watched people on the planet. Being stopped by breathing monster, with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and
law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom a serpent’s tail; as used in biology, it means an organism
may mean having one’s fingerprints and DNA collected, whose cells are not all derived from the same zygote. 66 As
whether or not one is charged or even arrested. The is discussed below, it remains to be seen which of the
United Kingdom’s national DNA database contains the two descriptions is more apt.
genetic profiles of over two million people. 57 Racial, ethnic, and national factors have played a
When biometric information is included in central role in law enforcement measures in the United
national identity cards, governments may more easily States since 2001. 67 That year, the United States
trace individuals’ movements within national borders. announced the launch of the National Security Entry-
The principal purpose of an identity card system is to Exit Registration (NSEERS), a program requiring male
link an individual to a body of data. Identity checks non-citizens over the age of 16, from certain countries, to
themselves generate data by creating information about provide fingerprints and photographs upon entering the
the location of an identifiable individual at a given time country. 68 NSEERS targeted nationals of primarily
and place. This in turn impacts upon privacy and further Arabic and Muslim countries, and was intended to apply
reduces the possibility of remaining anonymous. 58 to most foreign visitors by 2005. 69 In 2003, nearly 82,000
Several authors argue vehemently against the crea- male persons immigrating or visiting from predomi-
tion of national identity cards with biometric identifiers, nantly Muslim countries were registered in NSEERS.
suggesting that individual privacy should not be sacri- Their inclusion in NSEERS was based not upon citizen-
ficed for measures that may or may not actually defeat ship but rather ethnicity — it was the country in which
terrorism.59 With all due respect to these commentators, they were born that was of interest to U.S. officials. 70
their arguments reveal a certain naı̈veté: identity cards While the information contained in NSEERS appears to
are here. As we have seen from the preceding discussion, have been used in approximately 13,000 deportations,
and will analyze in more detail below, identity cards are officials indicated that the system identified only 11 indi-
comprised partly from information stored in electronic viduals as having links to terrorism.71 Five of these 11
databases, and partly from paper identification already individuals were actually charged with a terrorist-related
widely in use, such as driver’s licences and passports. offence. 72
NSEERS was intended to act in concert with the
Schengen Information System, the European Union’s
The Collection and Use of automated system containing personal information
Biometrics by the U.S. Government about migrants and people who are suspected of having
committed or witnessed a crime. With over a milliont is important to consider the collection of biometric entries, the Schengen system contains various types ofI information by the U.S. government both from personal information, including individuals’ professionswithin and outside its national borders, because, as will and their sexual orientation. 73be discussed below, the government is using this infor-
mation in an integrated manner. Another electronic database in the United States,
entitled the Student Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS), became fully operative in 2003 andThe International Aspect 
stores information on individual foreign students usingWhile there are over 300 air, land and sea ports of Internet-based technology. 74entry to the United States, most travellers enter by
land. 60 Following the attacks in 2001, the United States Formed in 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland
enacted various legislative measures aimed at countering Security (DHS) is statutorily mandated to prevent and
terrorism, including the Uniting and Strengthening respond to terrorism in the United States and reduce its
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to exposure to terrorism. Since its creation, the DHS has
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act61 (USA Patriot been a central actor in various crime prevention initia-






























































104 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
traditionally understood. Under a program called ‘‘Oper- ment of immigration laws within the United States,
ation Predator’’, the DHS finds and assists in the prosecu- including verifying whether individuals have overstayed
tion of persons involved in child pornography. If those their visas. Concerns have been expressed regarding the
individuals happen to be non-citizens, the DHS also knowledge requirements and increased training needed
assists in their deportation. 75 DHS is a huge government by immigration inspectors to operate and search the
department, and includes the Bureau of Immigration various databases. 84
and Customs Enforcement, the Science and Technology In a 2004 report to Congressional Committees, theDirectorate, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protec- U.S. General Accounting Office examined the expendi-tion, the Transportation and Security Administration, ture plan for the US-VISIT program and found that DHSthe U.S. Coast Guard, and the Citizenship and Immigra- had not produced either an adequate privacy impacttion Service. 76 The Border and Transportation Security assessment or cost-benefit analysis. 85 Significantly, theDirectorate alone employs over 20,000 people. 77 report found that DHS had not implemented the usual
That same year, the Total Information Awareness controls seen with the deployment of vast, costly techno-
Program was developed within the Pentagon to logical systems, such as independent verification and val-
. . . imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and tran- idation. The report concluded that if these failings were
sition information technologies, components, and prototype not addressed, their consequences would become even
closed-loop information systems that will counter asym- more serious with increases in the size and complexity ofmetric threats by achieving total information awareness
US-VISIT. 86useful for preemption, national security warning and
national security decision-making. 78 Most observers agree, however, that the viability of
Also in 2003, DHS announced that a new program US-VISIT will depend in large part on the integrity of
called United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indi- the various databases with which it will be integrated, as
cation Technology System (US-VISIT) will integrate the well as its compatibility with those databases. For
earlier NSEERS and SEVIS systems. Under the new example, the two fingerprint methods used under the
system, which is scheduled to be fully operational in current program, while adequate for purposes of authen-
December of this year, when non-citizens enter the ticating an individual’s identity, may not be enough to
United States through any of the air, sea, or land ports of identify a match in the 10-fingerprint system used by the
entry, they will be required to provide fingerprints and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 87 Also, while the USA
photographs, and possibly submit to an iris scan. 79 Using Patriot Act. 88 required the integration of the databases of
current procedures, once inspectors have scanned two the former Immigration and Nationalization Services
fingerprints and taken a digital photograph of the indi- department, the U.S. General Accounting Office criti-
vidual, they will enter the biometric information into a cized those disparate databases as being antiquated. 89
database and compare it against other biometric infor-
In a 2005 report on the implementation of the landmation already stored there to determine whether there
entry portion of the US-VISIT program, the Office of theis any information that would render the individual
Inspector General, an auditing body, identified severalinadmissible. When leaving the United States, non-citi-
problems. Among these are the fact that in its initialzens are required to have their travel documents
stages, US-VISIT captured less than 3% of those non-scanned, their photograph compared, and their finger-
citizens who entered by land, and the exit aspect of theprints taken once again. When non-citizens leave the
program at land ports of entry is not finalized. 90United States, officials from DHS will authenticate iden-
tity again, using biometric information, and input the As well, under the manner in which US-VISIT cur-
details of the departure information into the database. 80 rently operates, front-line immigration officers must
query several databases in order to perform the requiredDHS officials have commented that they may col-
verifications. These databases, which contain informa-lect additional biometric information when it becomes
tion obtained by other federal agencies, commercial air-possible to deploy technology that would allow for
lines, and sea carriers, include TIPOFF (a terroristthis. 81 Information in the US-VISIT database is intended
lookout database), the Arrival Departure Informationto be used for general national security purposes, and
System (ADIS), the Advance Passenger Informationalso to locate, and possibly deport, individuals in viola-
System (APIS), the Biometric Verification System (BVS),tion of their visas. 82 According to DHS, other countries
and the National Automated Immigration Lookoutare participating in the implementation of US-VISIT, as
System (NAILS), among others. These databases are sup-are U.S. local and state law enforcement agencies and the
ported by various technology systems, and are not cur-U.S. departments of State, Transportation, Justice, and
rently integrated with US-VISIT. 91 As a result, the knowl-Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the
edge and training requirements for immigration officersCentral Intelligence Agency. 83
has increased, and the additional searches required oftenCritics of US-VISIT question both the feasibility and cause significant delays at borders.ultimate usefulness of the program. It has been suggested
that the intense focus on border security has resulted in DHS expects it will take five to 10 years to trans-






























































Rising Governmental Use of Biometric Technology 105
tronically tracking foreign persons before they enter the to hear his case ruled that Kincade’s refusal to provide a
United States, at the point of entry, during their stay, and blood sample was indeed a violation of the terms of his
when they leave. In June of 2004, DHS granted a con- release. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
tract worth US$10 billion to Accenture LLP, which has of Appeals reversed this decision 2–1, concluding that
agreed to act as the ‘‘prime integrator’’ and provide the compelling production of a blood sample was a search
design, integration, and implementation of existing and within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that
new systems. 92 By January 2005, DHS had processed the government must establish individualized suspicion
over 18 million people in US-VISIT, resulting in over before being permitted to conduct such a search.
2,000 matches with law enforcement databases. Of these, In 2004, the Ninth Circuit voted to withdraw the
roughly half related to potential criminal activity and panel’s decision and have the case re-heard by 11 judges.
half to immigration issues. 93 In a close 6-5 ruling, the 11 judges ruled in favour of the
government, finding that:
The Domestic Aspect In light of conditional releasees’ substantially diminished
expectations of privacy, the minimal intrusion occasionedAs we have seen above, like many other countries, by blood sampling, and the overwhelming societal interests
the United States uses various biometric measurements, so clearly furthered by the collection of DNA information
such as fingerprints and facial recognition, increasingly from convicted offenders, we must conclude that compul-
sory DNA profiling of qualified federal offenders is reason-and in a routine manner in order to authenticate indi-
able under the totality of the circumstances. 98viduals’ identity. For obvious reasons, the collection by
the United States of individuals’ DNA has been the sub- The dissenting judges voiced serious concerns, and
ject of much discussion. The debate over the compelled would have ruled that programmatic, suspicionless
production of DNA for inclusion in a databank crystal- searches were constitutionally unreasonable. They
lized recently in the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court observed that DNA information contained in the Com-
of Appeals in United States v. Kincade. 94 bined DNA Index System (CODIS) has the potential to
reveal information about individuals’ genetic defects, In 1993, Thomas Kincade, a decorated Navy
predisposition to diseases, and possibly sexual orienta-Seaman who was experiencing worsening personal and
tion:99financial difficulties, robbed a bank using a firearm. He
pled guilty and was sentenced to 97 months’ imprison- When democratic values are lost, society often looks back,
too late, and says when did this happen — why didn’t wement, followed by three years’ supervised release. Fol-
understand before it was too late? Today’s decision markslowing his release from prison in 2000, Kincade’s urine
one of those turning points — a fatally unwise and uncon-samples tested positive for cocaine. At his request, the stitutional surrender to the government of our liberty for
Court ordered treatment in a residential drug treatment the sake of security, and, should the plurality theory ever
program, which Kincade followed; after this he appeared become law, the establishment of a doctrine that would
leave us without the legal tools to halt further abolition ofto be rehabilitated and to be getting on with his life.
our privacy rights. The compulsory extraction of blood sam-
One of the conditions of Kincade’s supervised ples and the maintenance of permanent profiles of Amer-
release, however, was to follow the instructions of his ican citizens is, unfortunately, the beginning not the end. 100
probation officer. In March 2002, pursuant to the terms The amicus brief filed by the Electronic Privacyof the U.S. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Information Center with leave of the Court, but withoutAct), 95 the probation officer asked Kincade to provide a consent of the parties, made the observation that theblood sample. The DNA Act requires individuals who collection of DNA samples in a relatively accessiblehave been convicted of certain offences96 and who are national database raises the prospect that the samplesincarcerated, on parole, or on supervised release to pro- may be used in the future for purposes other than thosevide federal authorities with a tissue, blood, or other for which they were collected. 101bodily sample on which a DNA analysis can be per-
Each of the 50 states in the United States has aformed. Like other analysts, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
DNA databank and over half authorize law enforcementtigation prefers DNA information from blood samples
agencies to retain DNA samples after profiling has beenbecause it is more reliable than that obtained from other
completed. 102 Three states allow the collection of DNAsources. Thus, the guidelines specify that a blood sample
from persons who have merely been arrested for anbe provided. 97
offence. 103 U.S. law enforcement officials have alsoKincade refused to provide a blood sample,
resorted to the use of what some call ‘‘genetic drag-explaining that he preferred not to for personal reasons.
nets’’; 104 they approach the family, neighbours andHe consulted with his lawyer, and did not present for
friends of the victim of a violent crime and ask for buccalthe scheduled drawing of a blood sample. Kincade was
swabs. 105arrested and imprisoned for violating the terms of his
release. He filed suit against the U.S. Federal Govern- In 1994, the federal government established CODIS,
ment, alleging that the DNA Act violated the U.S. Con- through which law enforcement officials across the
stitution’s Fourth Amendment, which guarantees against United States may access DNA information collected
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cies. 106 The number of profiles in CODIS has grown groups. 113 As well, so-called ‘‘junk DNA’’ was deliberately
exponentially; in 2000, there were slightly more than chosen for inclusion in the CODIS databank because it
200,000 profiles, and four years later, there were over a was originally thought not to contain information about
million and a half profiles. 107 CODIS lacks uniformity: an individual’s physical or medical characteristics. It is
each state has differing technical standards and different now known, however, that DNA samples derived by the
criteria as to which offences result in a DNA sample short tandem repeat technology that the Federal Bureau
being compelled from a convict. 108 of Investigation uses may provide information about an
individual’s race or gender, among other things. 114CODIS information is referenced within the
National Criminal Information Center (NCIC), another
While the National Institute of Standards and Tech-law enforcement database. NCIC is the largest database
nology, in its report to the U.S. Congress, concluded thatof criminal history in the United States, with informa-
the collection of biometric information from non-citi-tion about more than 52 million people. NCIC is refer-
zens in the form of fingerprints and facial photographsenced millions of times a day. Fields in NCIC indicate
— as opposed to DNA — raised no serious privacy con-whether a DNA sample from an individual is available,
cerns, 115 it is unclear whether consideration has beenand provides the CODIS file number. NCIC interfaces
given to the impact upon privacy and legal rights thatwith the US-VISIT program.109
the integration of the various databases may have.
Biometric measurements are increasingly prevalent
as a means of identifying and tracing individuals. In aConclusion and Recommendations 
world in which technological developments make the
t is clear from the above discussion that the U.S. gov- analysis of vast amounts of information at a rapid paceI ernment is compiling vast amounts of biometric possible, and in which governments concerned with
information, including genetic information, in electronic security issues seek to positively identify individuals, bio-
and searchable form, primarily from certain ethnic metrics play an important role. Biometric measurements
minorities. Described by some as a ‘‘new penology’’ that have potential flaws, however, that must be taken into
has arisen in the United States since September 11, 2001, account when designing the massive technological sys-
current profiling is an attempt by the state to manage tems into which they will be fed. When relying upon the
risk based upon group ethnic characteristics. 110 Aside results that those systems produce, it is essential to take
from the unsettling prospect of a government openly into account statistical error rates. This is particularly the
engaging in racist behaviour, this risk management case when the results relied upon emanate from a com-
strategy appears to be based upon faulty assumptions, bined database, where the original information was col-
given that persons who engage in terrorist activities often lected from varying systems, and using different criteria.
operate using their own identity, an identity that up
until the point of the terrorist act, was not associated The significant potential privacy implications must
with any criminal activity, 111 and, as was discussed above, also be addressed. Existing privacy legislation and infor-
biometric information is not a predictor of human beha- mation-sharing agreements were in the main designed
viour. prior to the advent of the widespread use of biometrics.
The arrest rate for African-Americans in the United National legislation and information-sharing arrange-
States is four times that of Caucasian-Americans, and ments, as well as international agreements, must be revis-
their incarceration rate is seven times higher. 112 One ited with a view to establishing protocols for the collec-
author has observed that the collection of DNA samples tion, use, and dissemination of biometric information in
in this context will result in DNA being collected a manner that protects, to the extent possible, the privacy
predominantly from African-Americans, thus increasing and integrity of the individual from whom it was origi-
the disparity in conviction rates among the two nally taken.
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Québecois Libre, No. 142, online: Le Quebecois Libre <http://23 Francis S. Collins, Eric D. Green, Alan E. Guttmacher and Mark S. Guyer,
www.quebecoislibre.org/04/040515-6.htm>.‘‘A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research’’, (24 April 2003) 422
(6934) Nature 835. 58 Daniel J. Steinbock, ‘‘National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment Issues’’, (2004) 56 Fla. L. Rev. 697.24 The variant form of a gene or DNA sequence that can exist at a particular
location on a chromosome. 59 See, e.g., Bijon Roy, ‘‘A case against biometric national identification
systems: ‘trading-off’ privacy without getting security’’, (2005) 19 Windsor25 Wall, supra note 5 at 111.
Review of Legal and Social Issues at 45.26 Jill C. Schaefer, ‘‘Comment: Profiling at the cellular level: the future of the 60 U.S., Congressional Research Service, Lisa Seghetti and Stephen R. Vina,New York State DNA Databanks’’ (2004) 14 Alb. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 559 at
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status563.
Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT) (Washington D.C.: Library of27 Owen D. Jones and Timothy H. Goldsmith, ‘‘Law and Behavioral Congress, 18 February 2004) at 2 [CRS Report for Congress].
Biology’’, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 405, at 495 [Jones and Goldsmith, ‘‘Law and
61 Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 111 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified asBehavioral Biology’’].
amended in provisions of 8 U.S.C.) [USA Patriot Act].28 Collins et al., supra note 23.
62 Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§442,451, 6 U.S.C. §§252, 271 (2002).29 Jeffrey Reiman, ‘‘Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration
63 Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 553, §§201–203, 8 U.S.C.of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future’’
§§1721–1723 (2002).(1995) 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 27 at 40.
64 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 4.30 Stan Karas, ‘‘Privacy, Identity, Databases’’ (2002) 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 393.
65 Ibid. at 7.31 Ibid.
66 Lesley Brown, ed., The New Shorter English Oxford Dictionary on His-32 Lightman et al., supra note 1 at 107.
torical Principles, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) s.v. chimera.33 Ibid. at 123.
67 Steinbock, supra note 58.34 Leroy Hood and Lee Rowen, ‘‘Genes, Genomes and Society’’ in Mark A.
68 Stephen H. Legomsky, ‘‘Immigration law and human rights: legal lineRothstein, ed., Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in
drawing post-September 11th: Symposium Article: The ethnic and relig-the Genetic Era, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
ious profiling of noncitizens: national security and international human35 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 576.
rights’’ (Winter 2005) 25 B.C. Third World L. J., 161 at 167.36 Jones and Goldsmith, ‘‘Law and Behavioral Biology’’, supra note 27 at 69 Martin, supra note 45.425.
70 Susan M. Akram and Maritza Karmely, ‘‘Immigration and Civil Rights37 Norwegian Data Protection Tribunal, Case 8/2002, online: <http://
After September 11: The impact on California: Immigration and Consti-www.personvernemenda.no/klagesaker/nrVII2002.html>.
tutional Consequences of post-9/11 policies involving Arabs and Muslims38 Norway, Personal Data Act (2000) No. 31, online: <http://www.ub.uio.no in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?’’, 38
/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20000414-031-eng.doc>. U.C. Davis L. Rev. 609 at 628, 660.
39 Convention for the Protection of individuals with regard to the auto- 71 Rachel L. Swarns, ‘‘More than 13,000 May Face Deportation’’ The New
matic processing of personal data, 28 January 1981, E.T.S. 108 (entered York Times (7 June 2003).
into force: October 1985). 72 Akram and Karmely, supra, note 70 at 628.40 Council of Europe, ‘‘Legal Affairs: Data Protection,’’ Ibid., see online: 73 Akram and Karmely, supra note 70.Council of Europe <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-oper-
ation/Data_protection>. 74 Legomsky, supra note 68.
41 EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 75 Teresa Miller, ‘‘Immigration law and human rights: legal line drawing
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the post-September 11: Symposium Article: Blurring the boundaries between
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, immigration and crime control after September 11th’’ (Winter 2005) 25
[1995] O.J. L. 281/31, Art. 2(a). B.C. Third World L.J. 81 at 99.
42 Dr. Lee A. Bygrave, ‘‘The body as data? Reflections on the relationship of 76 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 9.
data privacy law with the human body’’ (speech given at the Office of the 77 Miller, supra note 75 at 119.Victoria Privacy Commissioner Conference, Melbourne, 8 September
78 U.S., Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness2003), online: Privacy Victoria <http://www.privacy.vic.gov.au>.
Program: In response to Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,43 Council of Europe, supra note 40. Pub. L. No. 108-7, Division M §111(b) (20 May 2003), online: TIA Report
44 Banisar, supra note 6. <http://www.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.pdf>.
45 Philip Martin and Susan Martin, ‘‘International migration and terrorism: 79 Legomsky, supra note 68 at 170.
prevention, prosecution and protection’’, (2004) 18 Geo. Immig. L. J. 329. 80 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 11.
46 Simon Davies, ‘‘Sidebar: The Repression Trade’’ in Banisar, supra note 6. 81 Ibid. at.10.47 Andrew Hayne, ‘‘Counter Terrorism in Australia: the identity imperative’’ 82 Legomsky, supra note 68 at 170.(2003) 3 JIJIS 108.
83 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 9.48 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. 4385th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001), online:






























































108 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
85 U.S., United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressinal 99 Ibid. at 34.
Committees, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration 100 Ibid. at 52, Reinhart J.
Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed (GAO-04-586)
101 Motion of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center for(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, May 2004) at 3, 4, online:
leave to file accompanying Amicus Brief, in United States of America v.GAO <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-586>.
Thomas Cameron Kincade, No. 02-50380, February 27, 2004, p. 2.86 Ibid. at 7.
102 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 576.87 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 22.
103 Kincade, supra note 94 at 5.88 USA Patriot Act, supra note 61.
104 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 566; see also Kincade, supra note 94 at 33.89 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 21.
105 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 569.90 U.S., Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections, Evalua-
tions and Special Reviews, Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General, 106 Ibid. at 559.
‘‘Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indi- 107 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Brief of Amicus Curiae Elec-cator technology Program at Land Border Ports of Entry’’, (OIG-05-11) tronic Privacy Information Center in Support of Appellant, Thomas(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, February 2005). Cameron Kincade, Urging Reversal (No. 02-50380) (Washington, D.C.:
91 Ibid. at 21. Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2004) at 5 [EPIC Brief].
92 Ibid. at 22. 108 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 579.
93 Ibid. at 7. 109 EPIC Brief, supra note 107 at 13, 14.
94 United States of America v. Thomas Cameron Kincade, 379 F. 3d 813 (18 110 Miller, supra note 75 at 99.
August 2004) [Kincade]. 111 Bijon, supra note 59 at 45.95 Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
112 Similarly, among the 6.9 million individuals under some form of correc-96 The list of offences is quite broad, and includes crimes compiled from tional supervision in recent years in the US, ethnic minorities are dispro-more than 200 various sections of the United States Code. For example, a portionately represented; see Kincade, supra note 94 at 32.DNA sample may be required from someone convicted of damaging
113 Schaefer, supra note 26 at 576.property of the United States: Kincade, supra note 94 at 31.
114 Kincade, supra note 94 at 4.97 Ibid. at 2.
98 Ibid. at 24, O’Scannlain J. 115 CRS Report for Congress, supra note 60 at 21.
✄
R
E
M
O
V
E
U
se
rn
am
e:
 z
ul
ik
a
D
at
e:
 2
2-
A
U
G
-0
6
T
im
e:
 1
0:
32
Fi
le
na
m
e:
 D
:\r
ep
or
ts
\c
jlt
\a
rt
ic
le
s\
04
_0
2\
ca
m
pb
el
l.d
at
Se
q:
 1
0
